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Abstract 
Inward investment in the UK is likely to be negatively impacted in a number of ways 
in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’ via tariff barriers, but even “softer” forms of Brexit such 
as the current potential agreement are likely to cause customs delays, limits to the 
ability of firms to relocate staff, and to coordinate “servitization” activities. In addition 
are the the negative impacts of currency depreciation. In the context of already 
existing job market polarisation, inward investment flows in advanced manufacturing, 
food technology and financial services, which can bring ‘good quality’ jobs, are 
especially vulnerable under Brexit to frictions in global value chains. After 
highlighting the case of the auto industry, the paper moves on to stress the links 
between inward investment, employment restructuring and job quality given the 
employment opportunities foreign firms create.  
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Introduction  
 
This paper makes suggestions for developing industrial policy in the UK post Brexit, 
starting with an appreciation of how Brexit will impact on foreign investment flows in 
to the UK. The latter is especially important for the UK economy.  The paper notes 
that inward investment is likely to be negatively impacted in a number of ways in the 
event of a ‘hard Brexit’ via tariff barriers, customs delays which will make running 
supply chains across borders more difficult, and the negative impacts of currency 
depreciation. After highlighting the case of the auto industry, the paper moves on to 
note the links between inward investment, employment restructuring and job quality 
given the employment opportunities foreign firms create. The paper points out that 
the UK economy already has one of the most flexible labour markets in the 
developed world apart from the United States, so greater labour market flexibility will 
be of limited value in offsetting the negative impact of Brexit on inward investment 
flows. Indeed, post Brexit, further increases in labour market flexibility to improve the 
UK’s competitiveness in terms of labour cost and hence attract foreign investment 
risks a ‘race to the bottom’. In the context of job market polarisation, investment in 
advanced manufacturing, food technology and financial services, which can bring 
‘good quality’ jobs, is especially vulnerable under Brexit to frictions in global value 
chains. In concluding, we point to a range of ‘design principles’ in developing 
industrial policy to attempt to mitigate some of the negative impacts of Brexit. 
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The importance of inward investment to the UK economy 
 
Inward investment is of vital importance to the UK economy. Compared to other G7 
countries, the UK has had the highest percentage of inward FDI as a percentage of 
GDP, at 64 per cent of GDP in 2014 (ONS 2016). Much of this investment is from 
other EU member states, as Figure1 shows. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Source:  House of Commons Library, 2016 
 
Indeed, ONS data indicates that the greatest contributor to foreign-owned 
businesses’ gross value added was EU business at 49.5% of the total and since 
2008.i The next highest contributor was the Americas; with 42%, while Asia, while 
third, experienced growth of 94% over the same period. At a macro level, one can 
speculate that a major attraction of the UK for non -EU investors has been access to 
the single market, while intra EU investment is a combination of firms seeking to 
access UK markets directly, and also coordinating activities along supply chains 
across locations. In addition, the proportion of R&D done by foreign firms passed 
50% for the first time in 2011 and has been higher than that of UK-owned firms every 
year since then, except in 2016 when it was equal.ii 
 
Understanding the importance of inward investment to job creation in the UK 
requires an understanding of investors’ motivation for being in the UK and also the 
activities that they undertake in the UK. Most of the investment in the UK from 
abroad may be classified as either ‘market seeking’, that is, coming to the UK to 
serve customers across the single market or in the UK, or alternatively ‘efficiency 
seeking FDI’. The latter refers to firms seeking the most efficient location to supply 
multiple markets and enable post-export activities. In order for efficiency seeking 
investment to take place, cross-border markets must be well developed and open; 
this type of investment usually flourishes in regionally integrated markets. Typically 
both types of inward investment are characterised by local multiplier effects and 
supply chain activity, which bring additional benefits to the host economy. 
 
In order to understand the activities that inward investors undertake, one has to 
consider the nature of Global Value Chains (GVCs  - the processes/activities by 
which a company adds value to an article) and the way in which multinational firms 
organise their value chains. Figure 2 illustrates the well-known ‘smile curve’ and the 
organisation of a GVC. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 
The UK has seen concentrations of activities at either end of the curve, with R&D 
and design based in the UK to the extent that more than 50 per cent of the private 
sector R&D carried out in the UK is done by foreign Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs). As for high value services and customer focussed activity (‘servitisation’) at 
the other end, one could argue that the UK has been potentially one of the greatest 
beneficiary globally of this new order of activity.  
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How is inward investment likely to be affected by the UK leaving the European 
Union? 
 
Investors in the UK will face a number of challenges as a result of Brexit if they seek 
to sell into the EU and operate supply chains that cross between the UK and the UK.  
Firstly, Japanese inward investors, backed by the Japanese government, have been 
keen to stress that future investment in the UK depends on tariff free and barrier free 
trade with the EU that is as uncomplicated and predictable as possible. A Japanese 
government memorandum has expressed concerns over the continued viability of 
Japanese investment in the UK in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’ without access to the 
EU Single Market. Nissan, for example, has commented that it will review its 
decision to build the next generation of a model in the UK when the form of Brexit is 
clearer (Bailey and De Propris, 2017). 
 
Secondly, there will be challenges for investors if they seek to operate supply chains 
that cross (sometimes several times) between the UK and EU. When the single 
market was created in 1993, many commentators speculated that intra-EU FDI 
would plummet. This turned out to be far from the case as firms took advantage of 
the opportunities to coordinate resources across countries. The single market 
connects innovative firms to the richest market in the world and, through EU regional 
policy and structural funds, allows firms to take full advantage of location economies 
where labour is available in low-cost locations. Honda, for example, has warned MPs 
of the consequences of leaving the customs union (House of Commons, 2018). 
 
Thirdly, the devaluation in sterling will also have an impact on inward investment 
decisions. As Driffield and Karoglou outline, the existing literature has some 
problems identifying the links between inward investment and currency 
depreciations. On the one hand, the depreciation in the pound makes UK assets 
cheaper for foreign investors, but on the other hand, the expected returns 
denominated in home currency also decline. Identifying the dominant effect is 
therefore problematic. Driffield and Karoglou (2018) analysed 50 years of time series 
data for inward investment into the UK and found that in (typically brief) periods of 
uncertainty, a depreciated sterling offers a temporary positive effect on FDI. But 
when the economy returns to being stable once again, this positive effect is not only 
annulled but becomes both reversed and persistent. In other words, a weaker 
currency will eventually lead to concerns over lower future returns to dominate 
strategic thinking. This, in turn, will inevitably drive investment elsewhere. 
 
 
Case Study: the Automotive Sector in the UK 
 
Much of UK manufacturing is deeply interconnected with the EU through complex 
cross-border value chains. Such value chains comprise intricate processes of value-
adding by firms in different countries, with component goods and services crossing 
borders multiple times before reaching the final consumer. The auto sector is a case 
in point. 
 
By way of example, a typical driveline system produced by GKN, the British-based 
supplier of automotive driveline technologies and systems, incorporates specialist 
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forged parts from the UK, Spain, Italy, France and Germany. These are assembled 
at GKN Driveline’s UK factory in Birmingham and supplied to automotive assemblers 
in the UK and EU. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.   The components, assembled 
drivelines and the then final assembled car could cross the English Channel several 
times (Bailey and De Propris, 2017).   
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
As noted above, these value chains need to be ‘frictionless’ in terms of tariff as well 
as non-tariff barriers (such as regulations and standards). As KPMG (2016: 13) have 
noted: 
 
“Original equipment manufacturers such as aircraft and automotive manufacturers 
could perhaps favour the simplicity and flexibility of an EU-supply base rather than 
dealing with the potential complexities of a company based outside the union. In the 
long term, more EU-based alternatives would emerge. As buyers churned their 
suppliers, UK firms might become more marginalised. The integration of supply 
chains is a double edged sword – our manufacturers are not indispensable”. 
 
It is a similar story for BMW which assembles engines at its Hams Hall engine 
assembly plant near Birmingham.  Engine blocks come in from France before being 
processed at the plant. They may go to Germany for further work before being 
assembled. The engine may go into a MINI assembled at Oxford or the Netherlands, 
or into a BMW assembled in Germany. The final car could be sold anywhere in 
Europe or globally. Components, engines and the final car could cross the channel 
numerous times in total. 
 
The most deeply integrated GVCs are Just-In-Time (JIT) supply chains. These 
originated in the Japanese automotive and electronics sectors, and are now 
widespread across many sectors in the UK and EU, including in manufacturing, 
engineering, retail and consumer goods markets (Bailey et al, 2018).  
 
JIT boosts assembly plant efficiency in a number of ways. In delivering components 
just when they are needed, and only in the precise quantity required, defects are 
revealed (hence improving quality), stock levels are reduced and the need for 
warehousing space and associated costs are reduced. Yeon Kim and McCann 
(2008) noted that prior to the 1980s, some $600-$800 of capital was tied up in per 
car inventory in the US auto industry, compared with just $75-$150 in Japan’s, which 
had embraced JIT principles. As a result, the average Japanese assembly plant was 
some 600,000 ft2 smaller than its US equivalent.  Widespread adoption of JIT in 
automotive industries from the mid-1980s onwards led to rapid falls in inventory 
levels and cost reductions not withstanding implementation challenges (ibid), 
including across the EU’s auto industry. 
 
So in JIT supply chains, firms hold little or no inventories. Supplies are delivered in 
very small quantities at high frequencies from suppliers which are located in nearby 
regions or countries. But for JIT to work, the whole delivery system has to be 
seamless or frictionless. The frictionless trade enabled by the EU’s Customs Union 
and Single Market allow such cross-European JIT supply systems to operate 
smoothly (ibid). 
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One example of JIT in operation is the Swindon assembly plant of Honda UK.  In 
evidence to the Business Select Committee late last year, Honda said that it retained 
just  four hours’ worth of parts at the Swindon production line, with cars made to 
order in response to consumer demand and parts delivered in sequence for that 
particular build. The plant requires 350 trucks’ worth of components to be delivered 
every day from Europe (House of Commons, 2018). Components arrive from EU 
suppliers within 5 to 24 hours and Honda – like other automotive assemblers – fear 
that border checks in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’ could cause serious disruption to 
supplies requires stockpiling of components at considerable costs (Financial Times, 
26/06/18). The Japanese-owned firm stated that every 15 minutes of customs delay 
would cost it up to £850,000 a year, and that it would take the firm 18 months to set 
up new procedures and warehouses if Britain left the Customs Union. Even then, 
with 2 million daily component movements, just minor delays at the Channel Tunnel 
and Dover would force hundreds of its trucks to wait for the equivalent of 90 hours a 
day (House of Commons, 2018). The firm has stated a warehouse capable of 
holding nine days’ worth of Honda stock would need to be roughly 300,000 sq m, 
and be one of the largest buildings on earth (Financial Times, 26/06/18).  
Some 75% of such components for Honda  come via the Channel tunnel rail link, 
which is likely to become a major bottleneck especially in the context of border 
checks under a ‘hard Brexit’ on a  large volume of small consignments . This could 
force Honda and other auto assemblers to shift to using sea routes. The latter are 
much less frequent, need larger deliveries and add several days of delay (Financial 
Times, 26/06/2018). 
 
Honda’s government affairs manager, Patrick Keating stated that “outside of the 
customs union, there is no such thing as a frictionless border. I wouldn’t say that the 
just-in-time manufacturing model wouldn’t work, but it would certainly be very 
challenging” (ibid). As a result, even short hold-ups at customs borders will likely 
cause major problems for the fine-grained supply chains involved in UK 
manufacturing and especially automotive, and will likely making Britain a less 
competitive place to assemble cars, for example. 
 
Indeed, if the UK leaves both the European customs union and the EU Single Market 
then it is very difficult to see how such cross-border JIT systems can survive in their 
current form. Customs processes, however, short, are simply incompatible with 
these systems, because of the uncertainty associated with delivery time variations.iii  
So it is little surprise that the House of Commons Business Select Committee 
concluded that “non-tariff barriers, in the form of border delays and increased 
bureaucracy, will… affect UK competitiveness. We recommend that the Government 
should, in its negotiations, place a high premium on securing frictionless trade for the 
automotive sector” (ibid). 
  
It should be noted that a Canadian style Free Trade Area (FTA) would not solve 
such problems. Individual truck-containers not only contain components from 
numerous different suppliers, but the combinations in each container will differ from 
day to day and even hour to hour depending on the model mix going down the 
production line at the end assembly plant (Bailey et al, 2018). In this context, 
enforcing compliance with the EU ‘rules of origin’ requirements would make cross-
border JIT systems almost impossible to operate. Nor will the UK be able to easily 
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switch to domestic suppliers in order to satisfy the EU’s local content requirements, 
as local content is far below the required 60% needed under the EU’s FTA rules.iv 
 
 
Inward investment, employment restructuring and job quality 
 
Inward investment is of vital importance to the UK economy, not least because of the 
employment opportunities foreign firms create, often in areas of high unemployment, 
such as the North East. Many high profile manufacturing sectors, such as the 
automotive sector highlighted above, are dominated by inward investors, along with 
professional service firms, especially in sectors such as finance. Analysis of firm 
level data collected by ONS for 2012-2015 reveals that firms with some foreign 
ownership account for around 20% of employment (ONS, 2017a). This large 
contribution is explained by the fact that FDI recipients in the UK are typically large 
multinational enterprises (MNEs).This concentration is higher in certain regions, with 
well-known clusters built around inward investment, such as automotive in the West 
Midlands. Firms with inward FDI were more productive than non-FDI firms and this is 
not limited to those sectors thought of as being high tech sectors, but includes large 
employers in other sectors. Analysis of firm level data suggests for example that the 
most productive drinks manufacturer in the UK is Heineken1. However, 
approximately half of this productivity difference is accounted for by the fact that 
MNEs are more prevalent in higher value added sectors and it should also be noted 
that the productivity gap between inward investors and the highest performing UK 
firms is much smaller than this headline figure. 
 
According to the most recent analysis by the ONS, in 2016 the UK businesses which 
received FDI employed 4 million people, 17% of all UK employees (ONS, 2018, 
Table 2).2 Half of these people (2.1 million) were employed by firms that received 
FDI from the EU, with The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany being 
the four largest countries. Similarly to employment, just over half of the approximate 
gross value added (aGVA)3 that was created by UK businesses in receipt of FDI was 
created by firms that received investment from the EU, and the total value of GVA 
from EU firms was £170 billion. The labour productivity, calculated as GVA per 
worker, of UK firms which receive FDI from the EU is over 70% higher on average 
than that of a UK firm that does not receive FDI from abroad (ONS 2018 Figure 21). 
The higher productivity of firms that receive FDI may be explained by the benefits of 
economies of scale, more advanced technology and having better access to 
international best practice, including management practices. Economic theory 
suggests that more productive firms pay higher wages.  
 
To assess the likely impact of Brexit on jobs and employment restructuring in more 
detail, first we explore recent trends in employment patterns in the UK. 
 
                                                          
1 Authors calculations from the “Orbis” dataset provided by Bureau Van Djik (accessed 06/12/2018) 
2 These employment figures differ from those presented in the Annual Business Survey release as they are 
based on micro-data from the Inter-Departmental Business Register, which uses a combination of business 
survey returns and administrative sources to populate employment estimates for every individual UK business. 
3 Approximate gross value added (aGVA) measures the value of goods and services produced and is closely 
linked to gross domestic product (GDP), although GDP includes taxes minus subsidies in production. 
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Employment restructuring in EU Member States is regularly assessed by Eurofound, 
the European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions. Their 
method is a ‘jobs based approach’ that focuses on the change in the number of jobs 
and uses pay as a proxy for job quality. The pay range of jobs is divided into quintiles 
and the change in the number and proportion of jobs in each quintile is charted over 
time (Eurofound, 2015). This analysis has revealed three trends for the UK: job 
polarization, an increase in non-standard forms of employment in general and in the 
worst paid jobs in particular. 
 
Eurofound’s research found that polarization (illustrated in Figure 4 for a shorter time 
period) has characterised the UK labour market since the 1980s: employment growth 
was observed in the lower and higher quintiles, while employment in the middle 
quintile contracted. The global financial and economic crisis further polarised the 
UK’s employment structures: during 2011-2013 employment contracted in all 
quintiles except the top one. When employment levels started to increase in 2013-
2014, and over 800,000 net new jobs were created in a twelve-month period, the 
largest employment growth was observed in the lowest two quintiles4. Polarization 
leads to the ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market: the disappearance of decent jobs in 
the middle pay quintile.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Figure 4 Employment change by job-wage quintile, 2011-14, UK and the EU (1000s) 
Note: The lowest quintile is on the left, the highest quintile is on the right. 
Source: Eurofound (2015) 
 
The second trend in the UK labour market is the growing share of non-standard 
employment, particularly: bogus self-employment and zero-hours contracts. While 
offering flexibility and lower costs for employers, zero hours contracts offer no 
income stability for workers and discourage investment in training either by 
employers or the workers. As a result, these jobs tend to encourage a downward 
spiral of productivity. Moreover these jobs are not necessarily temporary — over half 
of those on zero hours contracts have been employed on these terms for more than 
a year, some more than 5 years (ONS, 2016b).  
 
Another form of non-standard, flexible work is self-employment. While in most 
advanced economies, including the US, rates of self-employment have fallen, in the 
UK there has seen a sustained growth (Ashworth et al., 2014) and by the end of 
2016 15% of all those in work were self-employed (ONS 2017b). Self-employment is 
seen as an outcome of the flight from unemployment: much of self-employment is 
enforced and provided through temporary work agencies, with applicants having to 
be registered as self-employed to be eligible for placement in temporary positions 
(TUC, 2015). The average weekly earnings (excluding bonuses) of the self-
employed in the UK fell by 26% between 2007/08 and 2015/16 (Full Fact, 2018). 
Finally, the proportion of part-time workers who want to work full-time but cannot find 
full-time jobs is also markedly above the long-term average (ONS 2017b). 
 
                                                          
4 In Germany and Italy there was also relatively faster growth in low–paid jobs in 2013–2014 than previously. 
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To summarise these trends, intensive job creation since the end of the Global 
Financial Crisis has reduced unemployment in the UK, however, many of the new 
jobs can be characterised as ‘bad jobs’: low paid, insecure and with limited 
opportunities for progression. A study by Goodwin and Heath (2016) suggests that 
bad jobs may have contributed to the outcome of the EU referendum, with 71% of 
those working in routine manual occupations voting leave. 
 
Turning to the effects of Brexit and on jobs created by FDI, foreign investment in 
technology-driven high-skill sectors in the UK has created higher-paid jobs, and 
increased the demand for higher-skilled employees, such as technicians, engineers 
and IT specialists, leading to skills shortages in these occupations. Hard Brexit would 
jeopardise inward investment and the location here of these jobs by MNEs. In other 
words, the UK’s leaving the single market will make it more difficult for European 
businesses to invest in the UK economy, putting almost 20% of current jobs, some of 
the UK’s relatively ‘good jobs’ at risk.  
 
 
Mitigating the impact of Brexit? 
 
Policy makers at the national level acknowledged the problems of the ‘squeezed 
middle’ and those in low-paid jobs after the EU Referendum. Following Theresa 
May’s speech in July 2016 that announced the goal of making “the economy work for 
everyone” and having a “proper industrial strategy to get the whole economy firing” 
(Conservative Party 2016), the Government released the Building our Industrial 
Strategy Green Paper which set out proposals for a post-Brexit Industrial Strategy 
(HM Government 2017). In this document, however, the problem of low wages is 
discussed primarily as a barrier to productivity rather than a problem in its own right. 
 
On the basis of current UK government policy it is reasonable to assume, that we will 
see further increases in labour market flexibility to try to deal with the UK’s 
competitiveness problem in terms of labour cost. Such policies have proved popular 
with inward investors, and the greater labour market flexibility in the UK compared 
with countries such as Germany and France have long been linked with the 
historically high levels of inward investment in the UK. Critics point out that the UK 
labour market is already one of the most flexible ones in the developed world apart 
from the US, so increased flexibility is unlikely to have any benefits.  In addition, this 
type of ‘race to the bottom’ competitiveness is often criticised and rightly so. There is 
an emerging consensus among labour market and social policy experts that it is not 
enough to create jobs; rather better jobs are needed. 
 
From an inward investment perspective the essential problem is that the ‘middle 
region’ of activities of the value chain, characterised by lower value added and a 
higher volume of employment, are typically carried out outside the UK. Developed 
countries attempt to ‘plug the gap in the middle’ by seeking inward investment that 
will generate employment for the ‘squeezed’ middle. This can be achieved by 
identifying key sectors that hit the ‘sweet spot’ of high productivity but also 
employment generation. However, these sectors, such as advanced manufacturing, 
food technology and financial services, are the ones that are most vulnerable to 
frictions in value chains which drive away investment, due to the way they are 
organised in the single market. 
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Furthermore, it is established in the literature (Davoine et al., 2008) that inward 
investment will either generate large scale employment in relatively low value added 
activities, or, that it generates few jobs in more high value added activities. An 
example of the former may be logistics, or perhaps sectors of growing importance 
such as recycling. An example of the latter may be aspects of life sciences such as 
clinical trials, which offer undeniable value but limited volume. Therefore an inward 
investment strategy should create a mix of these sectors at the local level. The high 
value added investment brings new technology, potentially spillovers, and develops 
knowledge transfer and training into supply chains and related sectors. 
 
Drawing on a wide range of research evidence, the policy recommendations by 
Warhurst (2017) are not concerned with creating jobs, rather the focus is on 
improving job quality. Acknowledging that some firms deliberately take the low road 
(offering insecure jobs), the adoption and enforcement of labour standards regulation 
by the government is recommended. For example, Australia has introduced national 
employment standards which list minimum entitlements to all employees (Fair Work 
Australia, quoted in Warhurst, 2017).  
 
In the UK context, Green et al. (2017) adopted a different approach. Their research 
explored how wages can be increased in those lower-paid sectors of the UK 
economy where a growth in demand for labour was forecast (accommodation and 
food services, wholesale and retail and residential care). They recommended 
policies that would help upgrading employee skills and developing ‘career ladders’ to 
improve productivity and innovation and achieve higher wages. The analysis has 
also highlighted that the most important factor which drives wage increases in these 
three sectors is the aggregate demand for labour in a local area. Therefore, sector 
based policies alone will not achieve the desired higher wages - these policies need 
to be part of a broader, holistic economic policy which considers local and regional 
economies as a whole and supports job creation. 
   
 
Some design principles for future regional industrial strategy 
 
There is a danger post-Brexit danger that the UK’s weaker regions will be 
disproportionately adversely affected by Brexit (RSA, 2017). ‘Non-core’ regions in 
the UK are economically more dependent on the EU than the UK’s core regions (Los 
et al, 2016) through trade and value chain linkages as well as EU cohesion funding: 
there is a risk is that interregional inequalities may be exacerbated by any post-Brexit 
trade arrangements which reduce access to the EU Single Market (RSA, 2017). 
Aside from EU Cohesion Policy the UK has had made limited use of place-based 
policies. Post-Brexit the UK has to find ways to decentralise and devolve in a manner 
that does not further weaken lagging regions. 
 
In this context, having considered the possible impact of Brexit on inward FDI and 
the complex interrelationships between inward FDI and employment restructuring, 
we offer some considerations for future industrial strategy. These include a number 
of ‘design principles’ for policy to mitigate the negative effects of Brexit on inward 
investment and job creation. It should be noted that enacting these effectively may 
well require greater devolution of power and responsibilities to the sub-national level. 
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This could involve the creation of development bodies that can intervene more 
widely and strategically at a regional level, and do ‘smart specialization’ through 
regional level industrial policies (RSA, 2017). Combined Authorities may be one way 
to do that (in cities at least). Strengthening local capacity will be critical here, such as 
via building up local growth hubs to fill the vacuum left by the abolition of – for 
example - the Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS). This could be part of a 
‘Combined Authority Plus’ model, as could devolution of skills funding to the regional 
level.  
 
Above all, the government needs to avoid a ‘hard Brexit’ that sees tariff barriers 
returning, and, ideally, secure a trade deal that prioritizes access to the Single 
Market for as many sectors as soon as possible. 
 
It is also important to note that the UK should not return to the days prior to the 
single market, when regions effectively competed with each other for foreign 
investment, for example through subsidies offered to investors. Rather, we advocate 
a UK-wide FDI strategy based on understanding the benefits of a particular form of 
investment to the region, linked to key sectors. It also needs to be noted that there is 
a basic tension between competitiveness achieved by offering inward investors 
access to a low cost, flexible workforce and ensuring decent work and wages to 
employees. Coming out of the analysis above, we would stress the following design 
principles: 
 
Reconsidering the value proposition to inward investors. Locations will need to 
consider the nature of their value proposition to inward investors, backed up by land 
availability, which may involve some difficult decisions regarding opening greenbelt 
land.  Part of this proposition also involve building more robust supply chains  to 
support  inward  investors, addressing  skill  shortages, and working  with  firms  and  
universities  such  that  they  become  anchors  for both  foreign  and  domestic  
investment.  This will require a more activist industrial policy in terms of, say, 
rebuilding supply chains in the UK and encouraging ‘reshoring’ (Bailey and De 
Propris, 2014). It is possible that UK regions may be able to be more proactive in 
attracting inward investment, although as noted above it is important that this does 
not herald a return to the excessive subsidies that were paid in the 1990s. 
 
Develop an inward investment strategy through greater understanding of why 
firms seek to invest in the region. High value added FDI adds significantly to the 
underlying technological base of the economy, but creates fewer jobs, while FDI that 
generates large scale employment is typically (though not always) associated with 
less cutting edge technology. So any new strategy needs to communicate which 
activities will be able to attract inward investment of what type, and where this is 
most likely to be sourced from. This emphasises not ‘sectors’ per se, but rather 
activities on the value chains, where activity within the region is positioned within an 
international setting, and the vulnerabilities of value chains to global changes are 
recognised. The latter can include macroeconomic factors such as exchange rate 
changes or changing terms of trade as well as shifts in the nature of the value chain 
itself (Pejic et al, 2018).  
 
Consider value capture as well as value creation. Current thinking suggests that 
co-creating value, and capturing such co-created value in a sustainable way, through 
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the co-creation of sustainable regional ecosystems, and the adoption of requisite 
positioning and specialisation in global and local value chains strategies, can be 
seen as a new rationale for regional place-based industrial policies (Bailey et al, 
2018a). In this context, UK regions could aim to position themselves as niche 
players, that specialise in difficult to replicate ‘bottleneck assets’ in advanced 
manufacturing products and hard-to-imitate services, based on regional histories and 
legacies (ibid).  
 
Focus inward investment efforts on sectors where free trade with the EU is 
less important. This might mean, for example: seeking to maximise the benefits of 
large scale ‘anchor’ investments in infrastructure (in the context of the Midlands for 
example, HS2); recognising the need to support skills in jobs around project 
management and professional services associated with infrastructure projects; and 
building robust supply chains to support infrastructure development. 
 
Maximise the returns on inward investment. This again requires an 
understanding of the benefits of inward investment, for example of the benefits to 
supply chains or through knowledge transfer from inward investors into local firms. In 
order to understand how policy levers in this space can be applied, one has to 
understand the motivation and financing of FDI. For example, in the years prior to 
the GFC, a high proportion of global FDI was funded by debt; this has since not been 
available. One response therefore might aim to seek FDI which is genuinely 
exogenous to the UK, i.e. funded not by loan financing raised from UK capital 
markets, but from the home country. This varies by country. Much Asian FDI for 
example is now funded by cash flow generated in the home country, compared with 
US, EU and Japanese investment which is typically debt financed. A country strategy 
is required therefore for investment promotion agencies as well as a sectoral 
strategy. 
 
 
When selecting key sectors for inward investment, focus on job creation as 
well as value added 
 
Policy makers have a wider remit than simply generating productivity growth, in that 
they have to undertake a matching exercise between the value proposition of a given 
locality or region and the type of investment that they can attract. It should be 
recognised that from an employment and productivity position, all investment is good 
investment. While obviously high skill, high value added jobs will increase 
productivity the most, generating employment for less skilled people may well 
increase aggregate value added by more. Equally, lower value added jobs tend to fill 
from the local labour market, rather than attracting people in from outside. 
Sector based policies need to be part of a broader, holistic economic policy which 
considers local and regional economies as a whole and supports job creation. 
 
 
 
Focus on job quality rather than just the number of jobs created. There is not a 
trade-off between creating jobs and job quality (Driffield and Kim, 2018). In other 
words more and better jobs are compatible. Often inward investment, and their 
accompanying supply chains have a disproportionate influence with policy makers, 
12 
 
as the current Brexit debates illustrate. Often inward investors can influence local 
and regional skills strategies to fill skills gaps in ways that local firms often find 
challenging. Regions can then use the needs to service inward investors as part of 
their ‘ask’ of the national government around (the devolution of) education and 
training. 
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Figure 1 GKN Driveline: illustration of an integrated supply chain (reproduced with 
permission of KMPG). 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Inward investment to the UK by source (stock, £ billion) 
 
 
 
Source: House of Commons Library, 2016 
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Figure 3: The “smile” of value production5 : 
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5 Source: Adapted from Mudambi (2008). 
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Figure 4 Employment change by job-wage quintile, 2011-14, UK and the EU (1000s) 
 
  
 
Note: The lowest quintile is on the left, the highest quintile is on the right. 
Source: Eurofound (2015) 
 
                                                          
i See:  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/businessservices/articles/annualbusinesssurvey/
uknonfinancialbusinesseconomyforeignownedbusinesses2008to2015. 
ii See: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/researchanddevelopmentexpenditure/b
ulletins/businessenterpriseresearchanddevelopment/2017#over-half-of-all-uk-business-expenditure-on-
performing-rd-was-by-foreign-owned-businesses. 
iii Aston Martin is even considering flying in engines supplied by Daimler form Germany in the event of a no 
deal Brexit (The Guardian, 15/11/2018). 
iv See Holmes (2016): he highlights difficulties to be overcome with sectoral deals for industries like 
automotive. While a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would make exported cars free of tariffs into the EU, to 
benefit from this such exports would need to meet EU FTA Rules of Origin.  These require 60% of a car's value 
added to be ‘local’ to benefit from the FTA (or with parts and components from the EU under a so-called 
‘cumulation’ agreement). Furthermore, in order to eliminate border bureaucracy there would need to be a 
customs union arrangement and a Mutual Recognition agreement for conformity assessment. However, to 
ensure automatic mutual recognition of the UK’s conformity assessment, EEA states have to accept 
supranational enforcement, which contradicts one of the UK’s ‘red lines’ in Brexit talks. 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
UK aggregate employment shifts by job quintile
2011-14 2013-14
